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The Influence of Delay and Item Difficulty in Criminal Justice 
Systems on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy 
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Abstract: There is international concern about the negative effects of delays in Criminal Justice Systems. Problems 
include the deleterious effects that delay can have on witnesses’ memory accuracy and witnesses’ ability to calibrate 
their memories accurately. Little empirical work has been conducted on these issues combined with item difficulty and 
the relationship between accuracy and confidence. This paper investigates these issues. 
21 witnesses were interviewed about an observed crime and required to answer lawyerly questions used in cross-
examination relating to target items classified as ‘easy’, ‘moderate’ and ‘difficult’, in terms of memorability. Participants 
were interviewed again, 6 months later. A 6 month delay significantly reduced memory accuracy for all levels of question 
difficulty. Within-subjects C-A relationships seemed to be relatively unaffected by delay; i.e. they tended to be positive for 
easy and moderate items, and negative for difficult items. Between-subjects C-A relationships were also positive for both 
easy and moderate items, but improved after 6 months; whereas C-A relationships for the difficult items remained 
negative and statistically insignificant following the 6 month delay. Delay can have a profound negative effect on witness 
accuracy that is not likely to be compensated for by improvements in C-A calibration.  
Keywords: Criminal justice, delay, witness, confidence, accuracy.  
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognised, internationally, that 
delays in criminal justice systems are endemic and 
problematic (Samuels 1997; Manarin 2009). For 
example, in 1999, the UK Home Office produced a 
protocol report in an attempt to reduce delays in the 
Youth Justice System (Home Office 1999); this was 
followed by two further reports focused upon this 
process element (Brown 2000; Ernst and Young 
Independent Consultants 1999). The latter report was 
originally borne from the Prison Service chief Martin 
Narey's review of delay in 1997. In New Zealand too, 
particular concern has been expressed about delays 
that child witnesses face in giving evidence in court 
(Hanna, et al. 2010). Also, in recognition of the 
problems associated with delays, in 2008, in Ontario, 
Canada, the Ministry of the Attorney General 
announced its ‘Justice on Target’ initiative to reduce 
delays in the province’s courts, which was deemed by 
many legal practitioners/scholars as long overdue 
(Manarin 2009). And, most recently, the judiciary in 
England and Wales have introduced a ‘Stop Delaying 
Justice’ initiative’ (see Riddle 2012), which aims to 
reduce delays in the system; it is intended that every 
magistrate, legal advisor and prosecutor will be trained 
in the requirements of the scheme. 
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There are a number of reasons why the reduction of 
delays in the system might be beneficial. For example, 
delays may affect general confidence in the legal 
system, may cause protracted frustration, worry and 
distress to those involved, and may prevent victims of 
crime, and those associated with them, from ‘moving 
on’ (Hanna, et al. 2010; Manarin 2009). However, 
perhaps most significantly, it has been argued that 
delay may have an adverse effect on the memory of 
those required to give evidence. As Manarin 
(2009:125) has emphasized, the most valuable 
commodity possessed by a witness called to testify at a 
criminal trial is his or her memory. This is because, 
when credibility is not an issue, accurate memory 
should help guide the trier of fact towards an accurate 
verdict; hence he says, ‘When a trial takes place 
without unreasonable delay, with all witnesses 
available and memories fresh, it is far more certain that 
the guilty parties who committed the crimes will be 
convicted and punished and those that did not, will be 
acquitted and vindicated’. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Empirical evidence from the psychological literature 
suggests that concern about effects of delay on 
memory may be justified. For example, a variety of 
evidence indicates that people typically remember less 
about an event when recall takes place after a delay; 
moreover, the deterioration in recall performance as a 
result of delay is often observed even when 
participants have been given an earlier opportunity for 
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recall (Flin, Boon, Knox and Bull 2011; La Rooy, Pipe 
and Murray 2005; Lipton 1977; Turtle and Yuille 1994). 
However, in courtroom situations, in particular, the 
perceived accuracy of witness memory is influenced 
fundamentally by the confidence that the witness 
displays in that memory. If a witness recalls a fact, but 
expresses no confidence whatsoever in the reliability of 
his or her memory for that fact, it is unlikely to be given 
any credence by a jury. Indeed, in the absence of other 
forensic information, confidence is the main indicator 
used by jurors to determine the accuracy of a witness’s 
memory (Wells 1985; Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson 
1979; Wheatcroft, Wagstaff and Kebbell 2004). 
However, few studies have actually examined the 
effects of delay on the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy, and those that have, have produced 
conflicting results. For example, two studies found that 
repeated questioning of the same material increased 
confidence after 2 days (Hastie, Landsman and Loftus 
1978), and after 3 weeks (Turtle and Yuille 1994), 
regardless of accuracy. In contrast, Ryan and 
Geiselman (1991) reported that confidence decreased 
following repeat questioning after 1 week, but more so 
for incorrect than correct answers; i.e. there was better 
correspondence between confidence and accuracy 
over time. However, Granhag (1997) suggests that the 
positive effect after a short one week delay (1 week) on 
confidence-accuracy (C-A) may have been more a 
function of making repeated confidence ratings per se, 
than the effects of the delay involved. In support of this 
interpretation, Granhag (1997) found that whether C-A 
relationships improved after a 1 week delay rested 
crucially on whether participants were repeatedly 
tested, or tested for the first time after a week. If they 
were tested once shortly after the event, and then, a 
week later, given an opportunity to review their 
previous responses, and tested again, calibration 
improved; however, if they were tested for the first time 
after a week, it deteriorated. However, as yet, no work 
has examined the effects of repeated recall over a time 
period more akin to that experienced by witnesses in 
the Criminal Justice System, such as, six months or 
more. Even if repeated testing after a week can 
sometimes increase C-A relationships, will it still do so 
after 6 months? 
Significantly also, as yet, no research has examined 
the possible differential effects of delay and memory on 
accuracy and confidence for different kinds of target 
items. As background to this, it can be noted that 
general findings regarding the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy in witness memory have been 
mixed. For example, a number of reviews have 
suggested that there is either no relationship, or only a 
small positive relationship between witness confidence 
and accuracy (Bothwell, Deffenbacher and Brigham 
1987; Deffenbacher 1980; Fruzzetti, Toland, Teller and 
Loftus 1992; Penrod, Loftus and Winkler 1982; Sporer, 
Penrod, Read and Cutler 1995; Wells 1993; Wells and 
Murray, 1984). Nevertheless, other research suggests 
that C-A relationships vary according to a variety of 
factors, including the method used to calculate the 
correlations. For example, in an attempt to explain 
negative findings, Smith, Kassin and Ellsworth (1989) 
suggested that researchers have concentrated too 
much on ‘between subjects’ confidence-accuracy 
relationships which involve calculating an average 
confidence and accuracy score for each participant, 
and then comparing the accuracy of confident 
witnesses to less confident witnesses; this produces a 
single between subject correlation for the group. Smith, 
et al. suggest that higher correspondence between 
confidence and accuracy might be obtained by 
examining the relationships within participants’ own 
judgments by calculating a separate confidence-
accuracy correlation for each participant; the individual 
correlations can then be averaged to produce a single 
mean ‘within subjects’ correlation for the group. 
Moreover, arguably, as within-subjects relationships 
provide a finer discrimination for each witness, they 
maybe more meaningful in real life courtroom 
situations, especially when there are only a few key 
witnesses. Nevertheless, Smith, et al., found, using a 
forced choice task, that both within- and between-
subjects C-A correlations were still very low. 
Nevertheless, Perfect, Watson and Wagstaff (1993) 
repeated Smith, et al.’s study with a control for 
guessing, and found that within subjects C-A 
correlations were higher than between subjects C-A 
correlations. 
In a further attempt to explain the variability in C-A 
findings, therefore, Kebbell, Wagstaff and Covey 
(1996) argued that a critical variable may be item 
difficulty. They suggested that, in laboratory studies, to 
avoid ceiling effects, researchers will tend to avoid 
‘easy’ questions that more or less anyone will get right. 
However, little relationship will be found between 
confidence and accuracy when witnesses are asked to 
remember a relatively homogeneous pool of difficult or 
moderately difficult items (for example, items 
concerning peripheral detail such as details of 
mailboxes or pictures); but if variance is increased 
through the inclusion of items that are easier to 
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remember (for example, items reading the sex of the 
perpetrator, or whether it was night or day at the time), 
confidence-accuracy relationships may improve. A 
number of studies have found support for these 
predictions for a variety of stimulus conditions including 
eyewitness identification; they also indicate that C-A 
correlations tend to be higher for easy items generally, 
because easy items tend to be remembered in an ‘all 
or none’ fashion (Kebbell, et al. 1996; Lindsay, Read 
and Sharma 1998; Wheatcroft, et al. 2004). These 
findings suggest that any study looking at the effects of 
delay on memory in a legal context should examine, 
not only between and within subjects C-A correlations, 
but also the effects of using items of varying difficulty.  
A final consideration, as yet unexamined in 
research on the effects of delay on witness memory, is 
the use of what is known as the ‘lawyerese’ questioning 
style (Wheatcroft, Kebbell and Wagstaff 2001; 
Wheatcroft, et al. 2004; Wheatcroft 2012). Cross-
examination procedures have long been thought by the 
legal profession to be crucial for probing the accuracy 
of evidence obtained in the examination-in-chief, and to 
expose unreliable or dishonest witnesses (Stone 1988). 
However, despite an extensive psychological literature 
pointing to the dangers of leading questions in 
producing memory distortions (see, for example, Loftus 
1979; 2003), a firm rationale has developed in legal 
culture whereby leading questions may be permitted 
during cross-examination (Keane and Fortson 2011; 
Wheatcroft 2012). Moreover, it is generally contended 
that asking questions containing false pre-supposition 
is a normal, useful, and effective procedure for verifying 
doubtful information and introducing new information 
(Hickey 1993); i.e. the admissibility of leading questions 
seems to be based upon the notion that they serve to 
calibrate or assess the memories of witnesses. 
However, leading questions of the type asked during 
cross-examination are not only usually suggestive to a 
degree, but also tend to limit responses made to a two-
alternative forced choice alternative (i.e. yes/no), with a 
particular emphasis on the encouragement of 
affirmative responses (‘e.g. ‘The car was black, wasn’t 
it?’, ‘You would agree that ....’). This not only 
encourages ‘yea saying’, but gives witnesses little 
opportunity to elaborate or expand on their answers 
(Harris 1984; Kebbell, Deprez and Wagstaff 2003, 
Taylor 2004). Consequently, serious concerns have 
been raised with regard to basic paradigms of justice 
and fairness in that ‘lawyerese’ questions can suggest 
or compel responses not made to other less directive 
forms of questioning (Brennan 1995; Wheatcroft and 
Woods 2010; Wheatcroft and Ellison 2012). Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this particular kind of question style 
during interview has been demonstrated to have the 
most detrimental effect on confidence-accuracy 
relationships (Wheatcroft, et al. 2004). Despite this 
knowledge, leading questions put in cross-examination 
are still considered by lawyers as part of “the greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth 
(Wigmore, 1940; p. 29); though see Wheatcroft, 
Caruso and Krumrey-Quinn - forthcoming 
In view of these considerations, to mirror more 
closely the operation of the legal system, the following 
study investigated the effects of a six month delay on 
memory, examining both accuracy and confidence, 
when participants were interviewed using ‘lawyerese’ 
questioning. 
CURRENT STUDY 
Given that in general memory tends to decline over 
time (Jonides, et al. 2007) one might reasonably expect 
that both confidence and accuracy in memory to 
reduce over a long delay. However, it would not 
necessarily follow that the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy would decrease (i.e. C-A 
correlations would be reduced). Some studies have 
shown that, when participants are absolutely sure of a 
response, they invariably tend to be accurate (Kebbell, 
et al. 1996; Wheatcroft, et al. 2004). Arguably, such 
responses may be least likely to decline over time, not 
only because of the strength or salience of the original 
association, but also because they might be the most 
obvious candidates for rehearsal. Consequently, 
although there might be a decline in the overall number 
of correct responses over time, there might also be a 
corresponding increase in confidence-accuracy 
relationships as the distinction between the two types 
of response (accurate-confident, inaccurate-unsure) 
becomes more exaggerated (see also Ryan and 
Geiselman 1991). However, item difficulty might be a 
crucial variable here. For difficult items, where 
confidence may be low in the first place, further 
reductions in confidence and increasing ambiguity 
about memory for items, delay might intensify poor C-A 
correspondence. Thereby the research investigated the 
following hypotheses (H); H1: A decline in confidence 
will be found to be associated with delay; H2: A decline 
in accuracy will be found to be associated with delay; 
H3: C-A relationships will improve over time; H4: 
Poorer C-A correspondence will be observed for 
difficult items. 
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METHOD 
Participants  
The participants were 4 males and 17 females 
drawn from an opportunity sample. The mean age of 
the sample was 20.95 (SD = 5.45; range = 18-44). All 
participants were either students at the University of 
Liverpool or members of a research panel in the School 
of Psychology at the University.  
Materials and Procedure 
All participants were told that they were to observe 
a videotape of an event for a period of around 4-5 
minutes, and afterwards, they would be required to 
answer some questions. All participants were then 
shown, individually, a five minute colour video depicting 
a criminal offence in which a woman at a bus stop is 
abducted and forced into a car. During the incident a 
gun is pointed at a witness. Following this each 
participant was required to complete a filler task for a 
period of five minutes, which involved reading 
unrelated material.  
Participants were then interviewed individually by an 
interviewer who had undergone training to learn to 
modulate the voice consistently throughout the 
interviews. In the interview, participants were required 
to give answers to three sets of target items; 14 were 
designed to be ‘easy’, 14 ‘moderate’ and 10 ‘difficult’. 
Item difficulty was determined using accuracy data 
from previously published studies (Wheatcroft, et al. 
2001; Wheatcroft, et al. 2004). However, unlike in most 
previous studies, the questions were phrased so as to 
replicate the manner in which lawyers conduct cross-
examinations in court; i.e. they involved ‘lawyerese’ 
questioning. The phrasings were taken directly from the 
examination of several Crown Court transcripts. For 
example, for an easy question, instead of asking the 
witnesses, ‘did two men carry out the attack on the 
victim?’, they were asked, ‘do you also remember that 
two men carried out the attack on the victim?’ Similarly, 
for a moderate question, instead of asking witnesses, 
‘did the victim have long hair?’, they were asked, ‘you 
would agree that the victim’s hair was long?’ And, for a 
difficult question, instead of being asked, ‘would you 
say that this car had four doors?’, witnesses were 
asked, ‘isn’t it also right this car had four doors?’. For 
answers to be correct, all required an appropriate 
affirmative or negative response (half affirmative and 
half negative within each category of item difficulty).  
As noted previously, questions that prompt simple 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses, but lean, in particular, towards 
the elicitation of affirmative responses, are typical of 
‘lawyerese’ questioning. However, lawyers also tend to 
target critical items that are associated with 
inconsistency both within and between witnesses’ 
statements. Given that critical items are items about 
which there may be some ambiguity, this will most 
likely to be the case for items that are difficult to 
remember. From the cross examining lawyers’ point of 
view, the strategy of targeting difficult items makes 
sense, as cross-examiners are considerably less likely 
to influence the witness’ response to a very easy item, 
especially if the witness is perceived to be potentially 
harmful to the defence of an accused person. However, 
in doing so, lawyers will tend to target only a few critical 
items to prevent their strategy from becoming too 
transparent. Consequently, when wishing to cast doubt 
on the reliability of a particular witnesses’ testimony 
overall, they will tend target fewer difficult items and set 
these up as exemplars. This procedure was therefore 
adopted in the present study; i.e. there were fewer 
items in the ‘difficult item’ category.  
Following each question, participants were also 
asked to rate their confidence in the response they had 
given on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 9, where (1) 
represented ‘pure guess’ and (9) represented 
‘absolutely certain’. All interviews were transcribed. At 
the end of the interview schedule, each participant was 
thanked for his/her participation and debriefed.  
RESULTS 
Total accuracy (total number of items correct), 
mean confidence (mean scores on the 1-9 Likert scale; 
where 1 represented ‘pure guess’ and 9 represented 
‘absolutely certain’), within subjects confidence-
accuracy (C-A) correlations (mean of the point-biserial 
confidence-accuracy correlations for each participant), 
and between subjects confidence-accuracy correlations 
(the Pearson’s correlation between total correct 
responses for each participant and mean confidence 
scores for each participant, for the group as a whole) 
were calculated. The overall results (i.e. easy, 
moderate and difficult items combined) are shown in 
Table 1. 
Preliminary analysis showed that overall accuracy 
was significantly lower at 6 months (t = 6.67, df=20, 
p=.001). Also, between subjects C-A was found to be 
significant only at 6 months (r=.52, p<.02). 
As there were unequal numbers of easy, moderate 
and difficult items, to explore the effects of item 
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difficulty, the data for correct answers were 
transformed to percentage accuracy scores and 
analysed using a 3X2 mixed ANOVA 
(easy/moderate/difficult X 5 minutes/6 months), with 
repeated measures on the second factor. 
As expected, given the data already analysed (see 
Table 1), a main effect was found for delay 
F(1,40)=38.41, p<.001,2p=.49; overall percentage 
accuracy was lower after 6 months (M=58.75, 
SD=19.12) than after 5 minutes (M=70.95, SD=12.13). 
A significant main effect was also observed for item 
difficulty, F(1.36, 54.27)=71.23, p<.001, 2p=.64 (n.b. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated; therefore, degrees of 
freedom were calculated using the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Further univariate F comparisons 
showed that easy (M=86.56, SD=1.63), moderate 
(M=69.89, SD=2.62) and difficult items (M=38.09, 
SD=3.23) all differed significantly from each other 
(p<.05); i.e. easy items were answered most 
accurately, and difficult items, least accurately. These 
results further validated the selections of items. No 
significant interaction was observed, F (1.36, 54.27) = 
.44, p>.05, 2p = .01; i.e. delay did not differentially 
affect accuracy acrossthe three item difficulty 
categories (see Table 2). 
A similar 3X2 mixed ANOVA was also conducted on 
the mean confidence scores. A main effect of delay 
was found (see Table 1), F(1,40) = 23.91, p<.001, 2p 
=.37; i.e. overall, confidence was lower after a 6 month 
delay. In addition, a significant main effect was shown 
for item difficulty, F(2,80) = 101.78, p<.001, 2p = .72; 
confidence was highest for easy items (M=6.49, 
SD=.18). Further univariate F comparisons showed 
that easy items differed from moderate (M=4.80, 
SD=.20) and difficult items (M=4.80, SD=.20); though 
moderate and difficult items did not differ from each 
other (p>.05). No interaction was observed, F 
(2,80)=2.26, p>.05, 2p = .05. 
A further 3X2 on the within-subjects C-A 
correlations showed no main effect for delay, F(1,40) = 
.62, p>.05, 2p = .02 (see Table 1). However, there was 
a significant main effect for item difficulty, 
F(2,80)=50.10, p<.001, 2p = .56. Further F 
comparisons showed that the mean correlations for 
easy (M=.42, SD=.29) and moderate (M=.43, SD=.27) 
items were significantly higher than those for difficult 
items; indeed, overall, the latter were negative (M=-.16, 
SD=.35). The correlations for easy and moderate items 
did not differ from each other (p>.05). The interaction 
with delay was not significant, F(2,80) = .38, p>.05, 2p 
= .01 (see Table 2). 
Table 1: Overall Results for Mean Total Accuracy, Mean Confidence, Mean Within-Subjects (w-s) C-A correlations,and 
Group Between-Subjects (b-s) C-A Correlations, at 5 Minutes and 6 Months 
 Accuracy Confidence C-A (w-s) C-A (b-s) 
5 Minute Delay 
(n=21) 
Overall 27.95 
(2.16) 
6.29 
(1.00) 
.35 
(.14) 
.12 
6 Month Delay 
(n=21) 
Overall 23.48 
(2.79) 
4.55 
(1.25) 
.31 
(.15) 
.52* 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis; *p<.05. 
Table 2: Mean Percentage Accuracy Scores, Mean Confidence Ratings, Mean w-s C-A Correlations, and Group b-s C-
A Correlations, for Easy, Moderate, and Difficult items, at 5 Minutes and 6 Months 
5 Minute Delay (n=21) 6 Month Delay (n=21) 
 
Easy Mod Diff Easy Mod Diff 
% Accuracy 
92.52 
(6.57) 
74.15 
(10.47) 
46.19 
(19.36) 
80.61 
(13.39) 
65.65 
(21.62) 
30.00 
(22.76) 
Conf 
7.49 
(.98) 
5.67 
(1.26) 
5.49 
(1.10) 
5.50 
(1.32) 
3.92 
(1.29) 
4.09 
(1.49) 
C-A (w-s) .40 (.33) 
.47 
(.22) 
-.11 
(.33) 
.43 
(.25) 
.40 
(.32) 
-.19 
(.37) 
C-A (b-s) .28 .21 -.12 .50* .52** -.38 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis; *p<.05, **p<.02. 
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As an alternative way of construing the within 
subjects confidence and accuracy data, for each 
participant, mean confidence in ‘incorrect’ answers 
score and a mean confidence in ‘correct’ answers, was 
calculated. Mean confidence in correct answers was 
compared to mean confidence in incorrect answers for 
the two levels of delay (5 Minutes/6 Months) for the 
easy, moderate, and difficult items using a 3X2X2 
mixed ANOVA (Easy/Moderate/Difficult X 5 Minutes/6 
Months X Confidence Incorrect/Confidence Correct), 
with repeated measures on the last factor.  
In addition to the ANOVA results already reported 
on confidence overall, confidence in correct answers 
was higher (M=5.48, SD=1.70) than confidence in 
incorrect answers (M=3.63, SD=1.84), F (1, 40) = 
91.88, p<.001, 2p = .70. Also, a significant interaction 
was observed for item difficulty and confidence, F 
(2,80) = 64.12, p<.001, 2p = .62 (see Table 3). Further 
F analyses (p<.05) showed that, whereas confidence in 
correct answers was significantly higher than in 
incorrect items for both easy and moderate questions, 
there was a non-significant trend in the opposite 
direction for difficult questions. 
Also, a significant interaction was observed for item 
difficulty, confidence and delay, F (2,80) = 3.72, p<.05, 2p = .08 (see Table 3). To explore this interaction 
further, three 2X2 (Minutes/6 Months X Confidence 
Incorrect/Confidence Correct) were conducted on the 
data, for the easy, moderate and difficult items 
separately. Only easy items showed a Delay X 
Confidence interaction, F(1,20) = 14.64, p<.01; further 
analyses showed that, whereas confidence in correct 
answers at 5 minutes was significantly higher than 
confidence in correct answers at 6 months, there was 
no difference between confidence in incorrect answers 
at 5 minutes and 6 months (p>.05); the easy condition 
was the only condition not to show a decrease in 
confidence in incorrect answers after the delay. 
Between subjects C-A relationships were also 
calculated for each delay period for the three classes of 
item difficulty (easy, moderate, difficult; see Table 2). At 
5 minutes, no significant C-A correlations were found, 
and none differed significantly from the others (p>.05). 
However, between subjects C-A correlations for ‘easy’, 
and ‘moderate’ items were both found to be significant 
at 6 months (r=.50 and r=.52, respectively), whereas 
the correlation for ‘difficult’ items was not. Indeed, 
again, the latter was negative (r=-.38, p>.05). 
Moreover, although the latter correlations for the easy 
and moderate items did not differ significantly from 
each other (z = -0.081, p>.05) both were found to differ 
significantly from the correlation for the ‘difficult’ items 
(z = -2.85, p<.01 and z = -2.93, p<.02, respectively).  
Finally, out of 798 possible responses given by the 
5 minutes interval group, 285 were rated in terms of 
confidence as “absolutely certain”; of these, 89% were 
correct. For the 6 months interval group, 103 were 
rated as “absolutely certain” and, of these, 86% were 
correct. Overall, 87.5% of “absolutely certain” answers 
were correct, but there was a 23% drop in the number 
of such responses after 6 months. 
DISCUSSION 
In sum, as expected, the overall data showed that a 
6 month delay before further questioning significantly 
reduced both overall accuracy and confidence in 
responding. However, the effects on C-A relationships 
were more complex. Within subjects C-A relationships 
seemed to be relatively unaffected by the delay; i.e. 
regardless of the delay interval, they tended to be 
positive for easy and moderate items (and significantly 
so for the mean confidence in correct and incorrect 
items analysis), but insignificant with a negative trend 
for difficult items (participants were more confident in 
their incorrect responses). Between subjects C-A 
relationships were also positive for both easy and 
moderate items, but were only significant after 6 
months; whereas between subjects C-A relationships 
for the difficult items remained negative and statistically 
insignificant following the 6 month delay. Taken 
Table 3: Within-Subjects Mean Confidence in Correct and Incorrect Answers for Easy, Moderate, and Difficult Items at 
5 Minutes and 6 Months 
5 Minutes Delay (n=21) 6 Month Delay (n=21) TOTAL 
 
Easy Mod Diff Easy Mod Diff Easy Mod Diff 
Conf Corr 
7.70 
(.95) 
6.37 
(1.29) 
4.70 
(1.83) 
6.04 
(1.31) 
4.66 
(1.32) 
3.41 
(2.21) 
6.87 
(1.41) 
5.51 
(1.55) 
4.06 
(2.11) 
Conf Inco 
2.77 
(2.57) 
3.57 
(1.79) 
5.76 
(1.29) 
3.15 
(1.59) 
2.38 
(1.37) 
4.15 
(1.75) 
2.96 
(2.12) 
2.97 
(1.68) 
4.95 
(1.73) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. 
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together these results suggest that, whilst accuracy 
and overall confidence tend to decline over time, C-A 
relationships tend to remain positive for easy and 
moderate items. However, for difficult items, C-A 
relationships remain insignificant, with a negative trend, 
regardless of delay. These trends, however, seem to 
exaggerate over time for between subjects C-A 
correlations; i.e. the positive relationships improve, 
whilst the negative relationship for difficult items 
remains the same, or even worsens slightly. Given the 
high standard of proof that is required in a criminal 
prosecution, that being proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the significance of such correlates cannot be 
underemphasized.
With regard to the between-subject C-A findings, 
further examination of the data showed more 
consistent evidence of greater sample variability in 
scores after the delay. For example, Tables 1 and 2 
show larger accuracy and confidence score SDs for all 
levels of item difficulty after the delay. The trend for 
greater variability is also shown in the range scores; for 
example, for the overall data the range on accuracy 
after 5 minutes is 8, after 6 months it is 12. Any 
increase in heterogeneity would allow higher between 
subjects correlations (Kebbell, et al. 1996). Further 
examination of the raw data also showed a trend for 
participants who were generally accurate but not 
confident after 5 minutes, to become inaccurate and 
not confident after the 6 month delay, again raising the 
C-A relationship. One possible explanation for this is 
that people who ‘guess’ may be more likely to be 
correct in their guesses after 5 minutes because of the 
availability of partial memory traces. However, their 
guesses may become correspondingly inaccurate after 
6 months as the weak traces decay (Weingartner and 
Parker 1984). In other words, the initially weak 
correlations for the easy and moderate items were not 
so much due to participants who were confident in 
incorrect answers, but those who were not confident in 
their correct answers. However, the converse would be 
the case for difficult items where the C-A correlation 
was initially negative. If anything, the effect would be 
worsened if those who were confident in wrong 
answers tended to maintain their confidence in these 
incorrect answers whilst those who were less confident 
in correct answers tended to forget their correct 
answers over time. 
The present results offer no support for previous 
findings indicating an increase in within subjects C-A 
correlations with repeated testing after a delay (for 
example, Granhag 1997; Ryan and Geiselman 1991). 
The most obvious difference between the present study 
and these others is that a longer time delay was used. 
Though also, unlike in Granhag’s (1997) study, 
participants were not given an opportunity to formally 
review their previous responses. A formal review of 
previous confidence ratings was not used here 
because of considerations of ecological validity. Of 
course, there are occasionally situations in the 
courtroom in which witnesses do have some 
opportunity to review what they have previously said, 
such as when a police officer is allowed to consult his 
or her notebook; however, this is not in any sense 
equivalent to a detailed formal review of the kind used 
by Granhag. It is possible that within-subjects C-A 
might also have improved in the present study if 
participants had been given an opportunity to review 
and change their previous judgments; however, the 
applicability of Granhag’s findings might rest crucially 
on the validity of the witnesses’ original C-A 
assessments. If witnesses’ original within subjects C-A 
judgments were poor or even negatively related, the 
effects of confirming their confident responses might 
result even greater calibration inaccuracy. However, 
the effects of reviewing previous responses on C-A 
relationships for items of varying difficulty have yet to 
be investigated.  
Obviously, to be generalizable, the present findings 
need replication with larger samples, and over different 
stimulus conditions. Nevertheless, as far as they go, 
the present results suggest that one cannot make the 
general assumption that any decline in the accuracy of 
witnesses’ testimony over time can, in some way, be 
compensated for an increase and improvement in their 
C-A calibration. It appears that the effects depend 
critically on what is being recalled and how it is 
measured. The present results support previous 
evidence that delay generally has a negative effect on 
accuracy regardless of whether participants undergo 
repeated testing (Flin, Boon, Knox and Bull 1992; La 
Rooy, Pipe and Murray 2005; Lipton 1977; Turtle and 
Yuille 1994), and add to this by showing that it occurs 
for all levels of question difficulty. Irrespective, whether 
prosecution offices would have the resources to 
conduct repeated witness interviews to gage memory 
for upcoming trials is questionable. However, the 
present results also suggest that after a 6 month delay, 
even with repeated testing, there is no improvement in 
within-subjects C-A relationships. Moreover, although 
there may be improvement in between-subjects C-A 
relationships, this is limited to items classed as easy 
and moderate. If anything, the calibration is made 
8     International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research, 2015 Vol. 1 Wheatcroft et al. 
worse for difficult items, and there are no obvious 
grounds for arguing that difficult items will be any less 
forensically relevant in the courtroom. On the contrary, 
as mentioned previously, such items are more likely to 
be targeted by lawyers in the courtroom. It is possible 
that C-A calibration might be further improved if 
witnesses were given an opportunity to formally review 
and change their previous responses; however, even 
notwithstanding practical limitations, it is not clear 
whether this might actually be detrimental for items that 
are difficult to remember. Another point to consider 
concerns the 23% drop in ‘absolutely certain’ 
responses after the 6 month delay in the present study. 
As such responses tend to coincide quite closely with 
accurate recall (Kebbell, et al. 1996), any drop in their 
frequency is likely to indicate a decline in the quality of 
evidence provided. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, for all practical purposes, the 
present results would support the views of those who 
have concerns that delays in justice systems can have 
a significant and deleterious effect on the witness’s 
ability to provide accurate testimony in court. The 
tendency that effects can be worsened over time if 
those who were confident in wrong answers remained 
confident in their incorrect answers later in court means 
that such evidence could critically influence outcomes.  
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